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INTRODUCTION: PROPHETS AND POLICY

On the day I began writing this paper, the Los Angeles Times reported
that His Eminence Roger Cardinal Mahony created a stir when he devoted
his Ash Wednesday homily to promoting a five-point program for immigration reform. 1 He urged his flock to ask the Lord to open their hearts to
immigrants in the 2006 Lenten season:
This Lenten season, join me in committing our Lenten practices
to making room for the stranger in our midst, praying for the
courage and strength to offer our spiritual and pastoral ministry to
all who come to us, offering our prayer and support for the ones
in our midst who, like Jesus, have no place to rest their heads (Mt
8:20).2

* John and Francis Duggan Chair of Business. and Professor of Economics, Pepperdine
University, Malibu. California.
1. Teresa Watanabe, Mahony's Lenten Message Irritates Some at Service, L.A. TIMEs, Mar.
2,2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 6961782.
2. Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of L.A., 2006 Lenten Message: Making Room, Mar.
1, 2006, http://www.archdiocese.lalnews/story.php?newsid=720.
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Although the tone of his message was pastoral, the Archdiocesan press
release that accompanied it was pointedly political: "In his annual Lenten
Message, Cardinal Roger Mahony calls on all Catholics in the Archdiocese
of Los Angeles to commit their Lenten practices of prayer, fasting and good
works to immigration reform, 'especially in the face of increasing hostility
toward immigrants.'''3
The cardinal is not alone in putting his Episcopal weight behind a reform of the U.S. system. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops'
(USCCB) website confIrms this political commitment. 4 Specifically, the
Migration and Refugee Services section contains all of the trappings of a
public policy advocacy site. s For example, this section contains two public
statements by bishops urging a policy of legalization for eleven million illegal immigrants and urging opposition to immigration legislation passed by
the House of Representatives last December.6 It contains background reports on legalization, one claiming that "[l]egalization is a matter of justice"
(including a list of political talking points), and another asserting the bishops' collective support for the McCain-Kennedy reform bill and collective
opposition to the Sensenbrenner-King legislation.7 It also contains suggestions for homilists and liturgists to challenge parishioners to become advocates for irnmigrants8 and suggestions for religious education programscomplete with recommended children's books and a "cartoon contest in
which the students illustrate unjust treatment of immigrants, migrants, or
refugees throughout U.S. history."9
The bishops' aggressive advocacy, both to the Catholic flock and in
the political arena, is imprudent. By substituting their judgment for that of
their flocks, on policy questions about which Catholics of goodwill can dis3. Cardiool Mahony Calls on Catholics to Fastfor Immigration Reform this Lenten Season,
Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.archdiocese.laInewslstory.php?newsid=719.
4. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Home Page, http://www.usccb.org/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007).
5. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services Home Page, http://
www.usccb.org/mrsl (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
6. Statement from Cardinal Justin Rigali on Immigration Reform, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.
archdiocese-phl.orglpressreleaseslprOOlOI3.htm; Statement of Most Reverend Gerald R. Barnes,
Bishop of San Bernadino, California, Chariman, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee
on Migration in Opposition to the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and lllegallmmigration
Control Act of 2005 (Dec. 14,2005), http://www.usccb.orglrnrslhr4437.shtml.
7. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Office of Migration & Refugee Policy, Legalization of Undocumented Immigrants, Nov. 2002, http://www.usccb.
orglrnrsl1egal.shtml; U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Office
of Migration & Refugee Policy, Anti-terrorism Bill Said to Hinder Thousands of Refugee Applicants, 2007, http://www.usccb.orglrnrs/mrp.shtml.
8. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Welcoming Christ
in the Migrant: Prepare a Homily on "A Journey of Peace and Hope," Jan. 2007, http://www.
usccb.orglmrs/nmwlhomily.shtml.
9. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Ideas for Schools,
Religious Education, and Youth Programs, http://www.usccb.orglmrslyouth.shtml (last visited
Jan. 27, 2007).
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agree, the bishops appear to be overstepping their authority to teach Catholic Social Teaching (CST).
I make this claim, not because I find CST on immigration unhelpfulon the contrary-it has become an indispensable moral framework for my
thoughts on the subject. CST provides a set of first principles which I accept, partly on the authority of the bishops and partly on the power of those
principles to illuminate the moral stakes in social policy. First principles are
indispensable, and the bishops provide an important service in teaching
them. My unease does not relate to my opinions about current immigration
policy. Simply, the bishops are claiming an authority they do not have, and
are thereby putting their authority on matters of faith and morals at risk,
including their authority to teach the invaluable principles of CST.
CST is a reflection on the implications of the Christian Gospel for the
social order. According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church: "Christian
revelation . . . promotes deeper understanding of the laws of social living."lO As a result of reflection on the Christian revelation about humanity,
the Catechism of the Catholic Church provides, "[t]he Church's social
teaching proposes principles for reflection; it provides criteria for judgment;
it gives guidelines for action."11 These principles, criteria, and guidelines
have a claim on the conscience of Catholics, but they should not be applied
to the particular environments in which policy is made. The virtue of prudence is necessary to tum CST into policy.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church defines prudence as "the virtue
that disposes practical reason to discern our true good in every circumstance
and to choose the right means of achieving it."12 Prudence is the virtue by
which a person takes "the abstract good" and makes it real in concrete circumstances. In politics the exercise of prudence belongs primarily to the
laity. According to Lumen Gentium, the laity are the primary agents of
Christ's mission in secular affairs: "the laity, by their very vocation, seek
the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them
according to the plan of God.,,13 When the bishops teach about which immigrant legislation is worthy of support, they encroach on the practice of
prudence by the laity (assuming that the Episcopal charism-to proclaim
the Gospel, to teach, and to shepherd the church-grants a special anointing
to their prudential judgments about policy). This aggressive political agenda
is founded on a misunderstanding of the nature of prudence; it is itself
imprudent.
10. Catechism of the Catholic Church: Modifications from the Editio Typica No. 2419 (2d
ed., U.S. Catholic Coni. 1997) [hereinafter Catechism of the Catholic Church].
11. [d. at 2423.
12. [d. at 1806.
13. Documents of the Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium, No. 31, Nov. 21. 1964.
available at http://www.vatican.valarchivelhist30uncilS/iLvatican_counciVdocuments/vat-ii_
consC19641121_1umen-gentium3n.html.
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There is much to sort out here. What do the bishops teach authoritatively? What is CST? What good are the general principles of CST if they
are not applied? How are general principles turned into concrete goods?
While the discussion of these questions often turns on disputed matters of
ecclesiology and church authority, the crucial context of the discussion
should be the Christian virtue of prudence.
Section two outlines the principles of CST on immigration and addresses the common complaint that they are too general to be usefuL Section three introduces prudence and highlights the requirements for the full
exercise of prudence. Section four reviews the details of U.S. immigration
in order to make clear the various goods at stake in the application of CST
to U.S. immigration policy. In light of these requirements, section five
makes the case that the prophetic approach of the bishops, while suited to
point out dangers to human dignity, is ill-suited to the prudential decisionmaking necessary to create a just and merciful immigration policy.
II.

CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON IMMIGRATION

Man has the right to leave his native land for various motives-and also the right to return-in order to seek better
conditions of life in another country. 14
The principles of CST on immigration are not in dispute and are easy
to summarize. First, there exists a right to migrate. Second, this right is not
absolute; nations have a right to regulate migration. Third, the extent of the
right to migrate should be detennined in light of the universal common
good.
The right to migrate is rooted in the clear command in scripture to
welcome the stranger. 15 Immigrants are made in the image of God and have
the same dignity as nonmigrants. Their right to migrate is similar to their
right to property-persons have rights to those things that make possible
their development as persons; migration and property are both important for
the material provision of farnilies. 16 In Solicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul II
14. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, No. 23, Sept. 14, 1981. available at http://www.
vatican. valholy jather/john_pauUi/encyclicalsidocuments/hfjp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html.
15. Exodus 1:8-12; Leviticus 19:33-34. For an analysis of the rights context of U.S. immigration policy, see DEBRA DELAET. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY iN AN AGE OF RIGHTS (Praeger
Publishers 2000). The 1965 Immigration Reform Act. which made possible the mass migration of
the last forty years, should be understood as part of the Civil Rights movement of the sixties. It
was an international counterpart to the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act: just as all
citizens were to be treated as equals before the law, regardless of race or creed, all those seeking
to become citizens should be treated equally.
16. Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, No. 45, May 15, 1961, available at http://www.
vatican. valholy _father/john_xxiii/encyclicalsidocumentslhfj-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.
html.
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ties the right to migrate to the right to economic initiative, which is often
abridged in home countries. 17
Although the popes clearly assert a right to migrate, they frequently
express concern about the effects of migration. Although the international
migrant is clearly within his rights, the decision to migrate is regrettable
because it puts the migrant at risk of losing his faith and in danger of being
economically exploited. 18 CST frequently mentions the burdens of migration on the sending country. In Laborem Exercens, John Paul II emphasizes
that emigration is a regrettable loss for the home country, which loses a
subject who exercises creative agency in the society to which he migrates. 19
The popes have frequently expressed the hope that the reform of the international economic system will make migration less frequent. 20
Notwithstanding its solicitude for the plight of the migrant, the second
principle of CST on immigration is that the right to migrate is not absolute.
John Paul II's statement that "illegal immigration should be prevented,"
implies that states have a right to enforce restrictions on migration. 21 John
Paul II also stated that the right to migrate must be regulated in light of the
burdens it imposes on the host country?2 When the migration is large and
the migrants are from a different culture, the host country may "fear the loss
of its identity.'>23 Large migrations may strain the resources of host countries, since "practicing [migration] indiscriminately may do harm and be
detrimental to the common good of the community that receives the
migrant. "24
CST recognizes that immigration may put other human goods at risk in
countries that receive large immigrations, and therefore these countries may
17, Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei Socialis, No. 15, Dec, 30. 1987, available at http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father!johnJ)auUiJencyclicals!documentslhfjp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en,htrnl,
18, 18. Paul VI. Populorum Progressio. March 26, 1967. '(67 available at http://www,vatican, va/holyjather/pauLvilencyclicalsldocumentslhCp-vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html.
19, Pope John Paul II. Laborem Exercens. supra note 14. at No. 23,
20. Because CST regards migration as in some ways a regrettable right, it recommends a set
of policies, which at the same time guarantee the right, yet seek to make it less likely that the right
will be exercised. See Pope Paul VI. Octogesima Adveniens, No. 17, May 14, 1971, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/paul_vilaposUettersldocumentslhCpvCapL1971 0514_
octogesima-adveniens_en,htrnl (Pope Paul VI urges an international agreement to guarantee the
right of emigration); see also Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 16, at No. 45 (Pope
John XXIII points out that one of the benefits of international peace between countries is that it
makes migration easier, helping to guarantee the right.),
21. Pope John Paul II, Message for World Migration Day 1996, July 25, 1995, available at
http://www.ewtn.com/libraryIPAPALDOCIJP950725.htm.
22. Pope John Paul II, Message for World Migration Day 1993.
23. Pope John Paul II, Message for World Migration Day, No, 1, Nov. 9, 1997, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/john_pauUi/messages/migrationldocumentslhfjp-iCmes_
09111997_world-migration-day-19983n.html.
24. Pope John Paul II, Message of the Holy Father for the 87th World Day of Migration
2001, No.3, Feb. 2, 2001, available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/john_paul_iilmessages!
migrationldocumentslhfjp-ii_mes_200 10213_wOrld-migration-day-200 l_en.htrnl.
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regulate immigration. This begs the question: if the right to migrate is not
absolute, how are its limits determined? The third principle is that the mediation of rights must be tied to the universal common good. John Paul II
utilized the universal common good to define the boundaries of the right to
migrate when he stated "rights are concretely employed in the concept of
the universal common good, which includes the whole family of peoples,
beyond every nationalistic egoism. The right to emigrate must be considered in this context."25
Concretely employed, the universal common good implies the following about U.S. immigration policy. First, discussions about immigration
cannot focus exclusively on the costs and benefits of immigration to the
host country, but must also consider the costs and benefits to the immigrants. Second, the right to migrate is strongest for the most poor and vulnerable immigrants. Refugees and asylees fleeing dangers of death or
persecution have the closest thing to an absolute right to migration. Those
who are fleeing poverty have a strong, but not absolute claim. Those seeking education, or simply a more comfortable life, have a right to migrate,
but it is weaker than the right of the desperately poor and endangered.
These principles alone do not determine immigration policy in any
particular nation-justice requires that the rights of immigrants, however
strong, be balanced against the human goods at stake in receiving countries.
There may in fact be few or no burdens on the receiving nation. But, even if
the burdens are large, they may be outweighed by the rights of the migrants,
or by the command to welcome the stranger. Whatever the case, the principles of CST on immigration do not determine policy without reference to
the particular reality in which electorates and legislators shape policy.
At this point, some become impatient with CST. If it does not go past
its general principles to policy prescription, some believe, what good are
these principles if they do not determine policy? While it is true that CST
principles leave the citizen and the policymaker with much work to do, they
are not toothless. John Paul II defends the principles of CST against this
criticism, asserting its crucial role as a moral framework for analysis:
The Church has models to present; models that are real and truly
effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly
confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political,
and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another. For such a
task the Church offers her social teaching as an indispensable and
ideal orientation. 26
25. ld.
26. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, No. 43.1, May 1, 1991, availnble at http://www.
vatican. valholy_fatber/john_pauUi/encyclicals/documentslhfjp-ii_enc_O I 05 199 l_centesimusannus_en.html.
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According to John Paul II, the principles outlined above are not useless; instead, they are "indispensable." Of course, they are useless if they do
not result in concrete realizations of justice, but they make such acts possible by helping us to think clearly about them.
The principles of CST on immigration orient the believer toward moral
policy in two ways. First, anyone who takes these principles seriously cannot exclude the interests of immigrants from his policy deliberations-a
country should not only consider the interests of its own citizens when formulating its immigration policy. The interests of its citizens (the nation's
common good) are relevant but cannot be a comprehensive framework for
policy. A just nation cannot be completely insular; it must orient itself outward. Second, any policy that restricts the immigration of poor immigrants
can only be justified because of the very heavy burdens of immigration on
the host country, since scripture commands a special solicitude toward both
the poor and the sojourner.
Thus, CST sharply delimits the debate on immigration, even before it
is employed. In proclaiming it, the bishops perform a real service for the
faithful. CST does not determine policy, nor does its proclamation make the
challenges of prudential policy formulation any less complex. CST does not
by itself rule out all restrictions on immigration, because judgments about
the burdens of immigration must take into account the particular challenges
immigration poses for a particular country at a particular time in its history.
To turn principle into policy requires the exercise of prudence.
III.

PRUDENCE

Aristotle defines prudence as "a reasoned and true state of capacity to
act with regard to human goods."27 It is through the exercise of prudence
that we make the-good-in-general concretely real in particular circumstances. In the political arena, it is through the exercise of prudence that we
take CST and make policy. In The Four Cardinal Virtues,28 Josef Pieper
explores the nature of prudence, details the barriers to its full perfection,
and explains its central importance in the moral life.
According to Pieper, prudence makes universal goods concrete in particular circumstances. 29 Because the particular contexts in which an individual seeks to instantiate the good are highly contingent (that is, they are not
necessary), there is no formula or technique for exercising prudence?O
Human goods can be realized in different ways and to different degrees in
particular contexts. Not every good can be realized in every situation, and
there are trade offs often between the goods that can be realized.
27. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1027 (Richard
McKeon ed., David Ross trans., 1941).
28. JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES (Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (1954).
29. [d. at 10.
30. [d. at 29.
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Because prudence guides action in a messy, contingent world, one can
never be as certain about matters of prudence as one can be about theoretical truths: "The certitude of prudence can never be so great as completely to
remove all anxiety."31 First principles of moral theology can be known
more certainly than the implications of those principles in action. People
may agree about the principles, but disagree about what action to take.
And because human goods and human perfection become real only
through prudently considered acts, and each human being is called to the
responsibility and freedom that prudence makes possible, no person can be
prudent for another:
The imperative of prudence is always and in essence a decision
regarding an action to be performed in the "here and now." By
their very nature such decisions can be made only by the person
confronted with the decision. No one can be deputized to make
them. No one else can make them in his stead. Similarly, no one
can be deputized to take the responsibility which is the inseparable companion of decision. No one else can assume this burden.
The strict specificity of ethical action is perceptible only to the
living experience of the person required to decide. 32
The individual is called to realize the good in those matters which fall
to him, be they matters of responsible citizenship or of some other sphere of
action. This call to prudence is part of being a free human subject, and the
full response to it-embracing the burden and responsibility of acting for
the good-is crucial to the development of human personality.
Catholic teaching can guide the prudent person through education in
general principles. To go beyond this, by offering more detailed guidance,
is to risk the "non-human" rigidity of casuistry, and to stunt the moral
growth of the person called to be prudent:
No matter how much moral theology "goes into details," such
wisdom alone does not make a man "prudent" .... And any moral
theology becomes truer and more genuine, and above all more
capable of dealing with life, the more it expressly renounces such
a claim. The guarantee of the goodness of concrete moral action
is given solely by the virtue of prudence. 33
Pieper makes two points here, each of which is relevant to the specific
policy guidance the bishops are now giving on immigration. First, to give
excessively detailed guidance to someone called to exercise prudence can
rob that person of the moral development that the exercise of prudence
makes possible. Second, such detailed guidance about the particular application of general principles is counterproductive. The "guarantee" of success in leavening society with Gospel principles is the virtue of prudence in
31. [d. at 18.
32. [d. at 27-28.
33. [d. at 28.
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the individuals who act; a society of well-formed, prudent Christians is a
much stronger foundation on which to build a just society than a society of
passive parishioners who take their political marching orders from the
church.
If this were all Pieper had to say about prudence, his discussion would
still provide ample ground for the exercise of healthy discretion by bishops
in the guidance they give their flocks on social policy. Catholics seeking to
promote justice in society require knowledge of universal principles and
must instantiate those principles in a variety of concrete circumstances that
make specific episcopal guidance problematic. A bishop (or bishops' conference) who teaches the laity that CST requires support for this-instead
of that-piece of legislation crowds out the exercise of prudence by the
laity. The negotiations and tradeoffs which shape the legislative process,
and the multitude of tradeoffs facing the Catholic voter, both require prudence. Authoritative teaching about Catholic principles does not by its nature cover the contingent environment in which policy is made. Prudence
must govern the struggle to realize the principles of CST in society.
Pieper's discussion of the ways in which prudence can be defective
offers further insight into the pitfalls of religious guidance on policy. By
teaching principles of faith and morals, the bishops can claim the special
grace and guidance promised to the apostles and their successors. When
bishops venture beyond their teaching office into policy analysis, however,
there is no guarantee that their teaching charism prepares them for decisions
that are the responsibility of the laity.
Pieper outlines how the exercise of prudence can lead one astray. According to Pieper, perfected prudence "looks two ways": perceptively, it
requires an openness to the real contingencies which frame action, and imperatively, it is ordered toward action?4
Effective action for the good must take real conditions into account;
prudence must be open to the reality of the world and society. There are
three elements to this openness. First, the individual must have an honest,
"true-to-being" memory.35 This is not just a technical capacity to remember, but the will to remember truthfully. One has only to make this statement to underscore how common false memory, even the will to remember
falsely, is. Second, prudence must be docile before reality?6 The acting
person must allow himself to be instructed by reality-must be willing to
let the truth contradict him. The close-minded know-it-all, who allows himself to see only those things that confrrm his preconceived notions and serve
his political cause, cannot act prudently. Finally, the prudent person must
be able to confront surprising, unexpected events, and respond appropri34. PiEPER, supra note 28, at 11-12 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (1954).
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 16.
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ately.37 Reality often shocks and surprises us, and we must be able to adjust to it, not in a panicky or reflexive way, but with measured, nimble
judgment.
Although Pieper outlines the barriers to forward-looking prudent action, it is those defects in prudence that render the person closed to present
reality that seem most common in the political arena, where the bishops
have become active. The ferocious competition that marks the political fray
in the United States makes openness to reality a mark of a prudent person
very difficult. Those involved in the constant skirmishes of politics sometimes end up recruiting reality to their cause; instead of "true-to-being"
memory, they are prone to selective memory; instead of docility, there is an
unwillingness to let reality contradict their program; instead of nimble adjustment to the surprises inherent in any contact with reality, they may spin
facts to match the party line.
In light of the nature of prudence and the defects that mar the action of
prudence, we should not expect that bishops should be immune from the
pitfalls of prudent action in a politically-charged environment. The next
section reviews the particulars of U.S. immigration policy, identifying the
technical and prudential judgments that must be made to turn principle into
policy.
IV.

TURNING TEACHING INTO IMMIGRATION POLICY:
FACTS AND JUDGMENTS

CST insists on the right to migrate, but recognizes that the common
good of the host country may require restrictions on that right. If our obligations to provide justice to migrants put the common goods of our society at
risk-our economic order, our culture, and our security-then our just obligations to our own citizens may force us to curtail the right to migrate.
Restrictions on migration need not imply denigration of the migrants or of
the value of migration to them. The benefits of immigration to immigrants-the economic benefits of higher pay, remittances, and the potential
benefits to dysfunctional nations of having an overseas community experienced in the benefits of a free society-should figure into our policy deliberations. If we self-protectively curtail immigration, it is fitting that we do
so with a sense of regret and reluctance. And, we should not do so lightly,
without consideration for those who stand to benefit from our generosity. A
rights perspective allows us to properly balance our generous welcome to
immigrants against the burdens of immigration.
The content of immigration policy turns on three judgments. First,
what are the economic, cultural, and security effects of immigration? Second, how should the tradeoffs between the good of immigrants and the good
of U.S. citizens be weighed? And third, how effective, or ineffective, will
37. Id. at 17.
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the various proposals be at regulating the flow of immigration, or in mitigating its effects?
People can and do disagree about each of these judgments. The central
point of this paper is that bishops should not seek to privilege any particular
judgment on any of these three points, beyond insisting that the interests of
immigrants and the poor must be considered, and given appropriate (in my
view, heavy) weight.
It is to the "facts" of U.S. immigration that we now turn. After a review of the effects of U.S. immigration, we shall turn our attention to the
recent document of the U.S. and Mexican bishops, Strangers No Longer,38
which outlines a plan for immigration reform. The bishops' statement, because it promotes a political agenda, must embody judgments about the
particular facts of U.S. immigration, and argue for a specific balance between immigrant rights and the U.S. common good. Men and women may
disagree about these judgments; the bishops should be clear that such disagreement is not itself a rejection of CST, or evidence of a bias against
immigrants.

A.

Economic Effects

Current immigration rates are historically high, even compared to the
last great wave of immigration at the tum of the last century.39 In 2004
there were an estimated thirty-six million foreign-born residents in the
United States (12.3% of the U.S. population).4o Of these, eleven million
were naturalized citizens, ten million were legal permanent residents, and
ten million were illegal immigrants.41 The flow of new immigrants into the
United States peaked in 2001 at 1.5 million per year, and has fallen to just
above one million per year more recently.42
For the last ten years, immigration to the United States has become
increasingly dominated by illegal immigrants-today more immigrants
enter the country illegally than legally. At least 80% of immigrants from
Mexico in the last ten years have been illegal. 43 Ten years ago there were an
estimated five million illegal immigrants in the country; that number has
doubled, to between eleven and twelve million today.44 Immigrants were
38. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Strangers No
Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope, Jan. 22, 2003, http://www.usccb.org/mrslsttanger.
shun!.
39. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tb1.5 (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/prodl2006pubsl07statab/pop.pdf.
40. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEw HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.orglreports/report.php?ReportlD=46.
41. Id. The rest were refugees, asylees, and other temporary immigrants.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 16.
44. PANEL ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC & ECON. lMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION, NAT'L REsEARCH
COUNCIL, Background to Contemporary U.S. Immigration, in THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
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concentrated in a handful of states in the past, but are becoming more dispersed throughout the country.45
In line with CST's solicitude for the poor migrant, all discussion of the
effects of immigration should begin with the effect on immigrants. There is
little doubt that the income benefits to immigrants are substantial, relative
to their home country income. For example, a Mexican immigrant, working
full-time at California's minimum wage ($6.75 an hour) earns more than
twice Mexico's per capita income, and an even larger multiple of Mexico's
median income. 46 Much of the monetary benefit of immigration is sent
home as remittances. 47
The benefits and costs of immigration for natives fall under three headings: economic, cultural, and security. In the economic realm, both the estimated costs and benefits of immigration to natives are small. The National
Academy of Sciences estimates that immigration increases the incomes of
natives by ten billion dollars per year, most of which goes to employers of
immigrants and to those who buy the goods and services they produce. 48
This seems like a significant monetary benefit until you compare it to an
eleven trillion dollar economy. Immigration is neither destroying nor enriching our economy. Its continuation does not make us particularly rich,
and its curtailment will not ruin our economy, no matter what it does to
farming in California, to chicken processing in Arkansas, or to the nanny
market in New York. The numbers are simply too small to matter much.
The supposedly alarming estimates· of the net cost of immigration to
government at all levels are similarly small, although they are trumpeted as
if they are outrageously high. Careful estimates of the net fiscal cost of
illegal immigration to the federal budget (not counting the modest benefits
of immigration to social security) suggest that illegal immigrants impose
five billion dollars more in costs than they pay in federal taxes. 49 Again,
this seems like a large number, but it must be put in perspective. Five billion is .2% of the 2.1 trillion dollar federal budget; it is 1% of the federal
deficit. The federal government loses five times that amount annually-the
item in the federal budget for unreconciled transactions was $24.5 billion in
2003. 50 Five billion dollars is not too large a cost to bear; there are other,
DEMOGRAPIDC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 20, 51 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston
eds., 1997) (estimating illegal immigration in the mid-1990s)[hereinafter THE NEW AMERICANS];
PASSEL, supra note 40, at 3 (recent estimates of illegal immigration).
45. PASSEL, supra note 40, at 11.
46. ANDREW YUENGERT, INHABITING THE LAND 28 n. 37 (Gloria L. Zuniga ed.• 2003).
47. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS YEARBOOK 613
(2004).

48. Immigration's Effects on Jobs and Wages: Empirical Evidence, in THE NEW AMERICANS,
supra note 44, at 220.
49. Do Immigrants Impose a Net Fiscal Burden? Annual Estimates, in THE NEW AlIiIERICANS,
supra note 44, at 283.
50. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PREsIDENT 375, tbl.B-78
(2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cealerp06.pdf [hereinafter EcONOMIC REPORT].
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more alarming costs from illegal immigration than its effect on the federal
budget.
The only economic burden from immigration that comes close to being
significant is borne in California, on the wages of uneducated native workers. The five billion dollar fiscal burden on state and local government in
California-Medicaid and education costs-is large when compared to the
state's structural deficit of five billion dollars. 51 But even this can be put in
perspective when compared to total state and local spending in the United
States, which equal one and a half trillion dollars per year. 52 Because the
fiscal burden of illegal immigrants is concentrated in a handful of states,
those states have a strong case for federal help.
Perhaps the most troubling economic effect of immigration is its modest effect on the wages of unskilled workers. Immigration has decreased
unskilled wages by at most 3-4% over the last 30 years. 53 Although this is a
small decrease over three decades, it falls on the most vulnerable workersthose already adversely affected by trade and information technology. Thus,
it should be troubling to those who care about the native poor, or who place
native interests above immigrant interests. However, compared to the gains
to immigrants from immigration-a quintupling of wages for unskilled
workers from Mexico and tens of billions of dollars sent back to poor Latin
Americans each year-the losses to unskilled natives are small. Moreover,
a reduction in immigration will not protect native unskilled workers from
the effects of free trade and information technology, which have combined
to account for much of the stagnation in the wages of the unskilled.
The economics of immigration point to significant benefits to immigrants, and insignificant effects on natives. This rules out two arguments:
that immigrants are necessary to the proper functioning of the U.S. economy, and that immigrants are taking jobs away from U.S. natives. The economic stakes are simply too small to support either of these arguments.
B.

Culture

Arguments that immigration threatens the common good of the United
States cannot be based on economic costs and benefits; therefore they must
appear to threaten culture or security. The cultural stakes, whether they are
large or small, generate strong emotions that overshadow immigration debates. There seem to be two major cultural concerns. First, are immigrants
from non-European cultures in some way less suited for healthy democracy? Do they lack the habits-habits of compromise, self-reliance, and as51. Kate Folmar, California Faces a $5.5 Billion Budget Deficit Next Year, SAN JOSE MER.
CURY NEWS, Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://www.mercurynews.comlmldlmercurynews/news/
locaVstates/Califomialnorthem3alifomiall6020208.htm.
52. EcONOMIC REPoRT, supra note 50, at 382, tbl.B-85.
53. GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLlCY AND THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 36 (1999).
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sociation-that support U.S. institutions? And second, is a multiethnic
society necessarily prone to division? Is immigration a threat to national
unity?54
My expertise is in the economic aspect of immigration, and I do not
have as much confidence addressing the cultural aspects. Nevertheless, the
questions that must be answered in ord€r to gauge the effects of immigration on culture seem clear.
First, which cultural traits are desirable in immigrants? There has not
been as much discussion of this question as I would like. Some might argue
that it does not matter what immigrants are like-that America has successfully assimilated immigrants from very different cultures in the past. Nevertheless, if we care about the cultural composition of the immigrant flow, it
seems strange that we should favor immigrants from white Europe on cultural grounds. Should we really prefer, for example, 100,000 devoutly-secular, globalistic French over 100,000 religiously-devout Mexicans? Perhaps,
but there needs to be more discussion about the habits Europeans can bring
to our democracy. Perhaps devout Mexicans carry more healthy western
traditions into the United States than do Germans, Brits, and Italians.
Second, how are recent immigrants assimilating? How should we measure assimilation? Intermarriage rates and English language adoption have
in the past been important indicators of assimilation. 55 High rates of intermarriage played an important role in assimilating the inassimilable Irish, for
example. 56 These rates are generally high for Hispanics (45%), which bodes
well for their assimilation. 57 Furthermore, how crucial is the English language to assimilation? Immigrants who speak or learn English assimilate
faster economically and culturally.58 New immigrants still adopt the English language over time, although illegal immigrants are slower. 59
C.

Security and the Rule of Law

The combination of a surge in illegal immigration and the war on terror links immigration and national security in many minds. There is a lot of
confusion about the security stakes in immigration policy. Namely, this
confusion concerns the ways terrorists enter the country and function within
it. Although immigration policy debates focus on permanent immigration,
this kind of immigration is not a threat to national security. Terrorists can
54. See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION
(1995); PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: How DYING POPULATIONS
AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVlLIZATION (2002).
55. Social Dimensions of Immigration, in The New Americans, supra note 44, at 369, 376.
56. Id. at 369.
57. Id. at 370.
58. See ROBERT F. SCHOENI, KEVIN F. McCARTHY & GEORGES VERNEZ, Cm. FOR RESEARCH
ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, THE MIXED EcONOMIC PROGRESS OF IMMIGRANTS (1996).
59. See Geoffrey Carliner, The Wages and Language Skills of U.S. Immigrants (Nat'l Bureau
of Beon. Research, Working Paper No. 5763, 1996).
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enter the United States in many ways-as permanent residents, on schooling visas, or as temporary visitors who overstay their visas.60 The crucial
concern for national security in immigration matters is, then, the scrutiny of
temporary visitors and their timely exit when their temporary visiting permits expire. Each year, thirty-four million tourists, businessmen, and relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent residents enter the United States from
many parts of the world. 61 Since the United States will not reduce the number of temporary entry permits, it is likely that terrorists will attempt to
enter as temporary visitors so long as the federal enforcement mechanisms
(for screening entrants prior to the approval of their temporary visas and for
tracking their whereabouts until their visa expires) remain ineffective.
A discussion of the security stakes in immigration brings to the fore
the most troubling aspect of our immigration problems-the large numbers
of illegal immigrants who live among us. The number of illegal immigrants
has more than doubled in ten years, from five to eleven million. 62 Currently,
more immigrants enter the country illegally than legally.63
There is a long tradition in western political thought that laws be enforced, even to the point of recommending that unenforceable laws not be
passed and unenforced laws be repealed.64 Laws that are universally ignored tend to undermine respect for the law and corrupt the culture. The
presence of twelve million or so illegal immigrants in the United States
corrupts our law enforcement, our politics, and our economy, and undermines our ability to protect ourselves from terrorists. This corruption is the
biggest threat from illegal immigration.
The corruption begins within the consciences of the illegal immigrants
themselves. Millions of people are living a lie, pretending that they belong
here in the United States and have rights here. Their illegal status undermines their ability to bargain for better wages, to resist abuses by employers, and their incentive to learn English and assimilate into U.S. culture.
megal immigrants are more likely to remain in immigrant enclaves, seeking
safety in numbers. 65
lllegal immigration corrupts our politics, because it forces us to pretend that laws we have passed democratically are not worth enforcing. lllegal immigrants even have their own lobbying groups; some illegal
immigrants vote, no doubt. Advocates for illegal immigration insist not
60. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE OPEN DOOR: How MILl·
TANT ISLAMIC TERRORISTS ENTERED AND REMAINED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993-2001 (2002),
available at http://www.cis.org/artlclesl2002lPaper211terrorism.htmi.
61. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION, AND NATURALIZATION SERV., STATISTICAL YEAR·
BOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, tbl.37 (2000).
62. PASSEL, supra note 40, at 10.
63. [d. at 6.
64. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I of the Second Part, q. 96, a. 2 (Mortimer
Adler ed., William Benton 1952).
65. See BORJAS, supra note 53.

2006]

FROM PROPHECY TO POLICY

81

only that we tolerate their illegal presence, but that we pretend that the
breaking of our laws is a trivial matter, not to be brought up in polite company. We must pretend that the biggest problem caused by illegal immigration is the lack of documentation, not illegal status-it is not politically
correct to call illegal immigrants "illegal immigrants"; we must instead call
them "undocumented workers." Instead of deporting illegal immigrants, we
must develop new forms of identification for them-matricular consular
identification cards instead of passports and special driver's licenses. We
must treat them like they are legal immigrants and grant them in-state tuition to our public schools.
Our lack of desire to enforce immigration laws corrupts the immigration service. Complaints about how awful the old Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) department used to be, and how it would be
impossible to enforce immigration laws without a complete overhaul of the
immigration service are common. Much of the dysfunction at the current
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, which replaced the INS) is
due to the impossible task the department was given: to pretend to enforce
immigration laws while not really enforcing them, and to catch and release
illegal immigrants. 66 Although it is certainly possible to track immigrants in
the United States better than we do now, the immigration services must
overcome a legacy of disorganization that stems in part from the contradictory job it was asked to perform.
The desire to appear to enforce immigration laws while not really enforcing them has led to building fences at the border, but not looking for
illegal immigrants internally within the United States. This lopsided enforcement has been counterproductive. Before the era of vigorous border
enforcement the typical illegal immigrant stayed in the United States for
about a year, and did not bring his family.67 Migrants cycled into and out of
the United States. After the border became more difficult to cross, the average stay in the U.S. lengthened considerably.68 Immigrants who crossed the
border were less likely to go home, and were more likely to bring their
families, to settle down, demand driver's licenses and education for their
children.
Most importantly, the presence of an underground market for smuggling and fake identification cards undermines our security. Drug smuggling and human smuggling go hand-in-hand. Terrorists may use the wellworn illegal entryways, and take advantage of the false identification infrastructure already in place.
66. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FAcr SHEET: ICE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN FISCAL YEAR
2006. Oct. 30, 2006. available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/Pcl162228690102.shtm.
67. Sherrie Kossoudji. Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexican Border. 29 DEMOGRAPHY
159. 162 n.2 (1992).
68. [d. at 161.
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It may be that addressing the problem of illegal immigration will solve
most U.S. immigration problems. To the extent that immigration depresses
wages, it is most often the wages of legal immigrants. 69 The ability to enforce immigration laws may reinvigorate the immigration service. Legal
immigrants are more likely to assimilate than illegal immigrants. If there
are fewer illegal immigrants, and we are not bashful about searching for
them, there will be fewer ways for terrorists to hide in plain sight.
Of course, one can accept that illegal immigration is a big problem,
and suggest different ways of dealing with it. One might eliminate all illegal
immigration by opening the borders and giving out free green cards, or one
might actually enforce the laws on the books. Prudent citizens must weigh
the goods at stake in legalization and enforcement.

V.

THE BISHOPS' REFORM AGENDA

It is entirely possible for people to disagree with the above analysis of
the costs and benefits of immigration. Some argue that the costs of immigration to local communities, or to native unskilled workers, are larger than
I have suggested, or too great to bear. Others may reject my claims that
illegal immigration undermines respect for the law significantly.
Those who accept my analysis of the facts may use it to argue for very
different policies, by weighing the goods of immigrants against the common good of the United States differently. Some may argue that current
policies reflect too great a willingness to trade lower, unskilled, native
wages for greater corporate profits and higher earnings for immigrants.
Others may argue that the goods of U.S. culture deserve no consideration,
asserting that they are based on patriarchy and market imperialism. To
these, the legal chaos caused by illegal immigration may be a positive good,
a sort of protest which gives impetus to much-needed change in the legal
system.
Any disagreement this article generates about immigration reform reflects the point of the article: people can disagree about immigration reform, even if they share the evaluative framework of CST. When bishops
clearly teach the evaluative framework, they help us to think carefully about
the stakes in reform. When they push a concrete program of reform, they
encroach on our freedom and responsibility to make difficult judgments
about what should be done.
Recent teaching documents on immigration highlight the judgments
necessary to advocate for policy-the sorts of judgments the bishops appear
to take for granted. In January 2003 the Mexican and U.S. bishops issued a
joint pastoral on migration between the two countries, "Strangers No
69. Immigration's Effects on Jobs and Wages: Empirical Evidence, in THE NEW AMERICANS,
supra note 44, at 223.
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Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope.'>7O In this document, the bishops
advocate for a reform of the U.S. immigration system, consisting of widespread legalization of current illegal immigrants, the institution of an
equally large guest worker program, and for lighter enforcement at the
border. 7 1
The assumption throughout the document is that current levels of immigration to the United States from Mexico and elsewhere are not a burden,
and that those who suggest otherwise are xenophobes and racists in need of
a "conversion of minds and hearts," and "[p]art of the process of conversion
of minds and hearts deals with confronting attitudes of cultural superiority,
indifference, and racism; accepting migrants not as foreboding aliens, terrorists, or economic threats, but rather as persons with dignity and rights.'>72
In section two of the document (a review of CST on migration) the
bishops introduce a "presumption" about the motives of the 10.5 million
Mexican immigrants in the U.S.:
In the current conditions of the world, in which global poverty
and persecution are rampant, the presumption is that persons must
migrate in order to support and protect themselves and that nations who are able to receive them should do so whenever possible. It is through this lens that we assess the current migration
reality between the United States and Mexico. 73
In this passage the bishops assert that Mexican migrants are all refugees,
who are fleeing conditions of desperate, life-threatening poverty or persecution. This blanket assertion is certainly debatable: Mexico's standard of living is certainly well below that of the United States, but is comfortably
above that of desperately poor nations. 74 Many Mexicans are very poor, but
they are not refugees; consequently, their right to migrate is not absolute.
The bishops begin their policy analysis with a discussion of the root
causes of migration?' Migration from Mexico to the United States is rooted
in the large differences in income between the two countries.76 However,
the bishops fail to mention the widespread corruption and crime in Mexico,
choosing instead to focus on public programs to create jobs in rural communities, and joint programs between the United States and Mexican governments along the border.77 By ignoring the role of corruption in the
restriction of economic initiative in Mexico, the bishops ignore an impor70. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 38.
71. ld. 'I 58.
72. ld. 'I 40.

73. Id.139.
74. United Nations Dev. Programme, Human Dev. Report 2006, Beyond Scarcity: Power,
Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis (2006), http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/pdfs/reportlHDR06complete.pdf.
75. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 38. TI 59-62.
76. ld. 'I 60.
77. ld. 'I 62.
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tant barrier to refonn of the Mexican economy and the U.S. immigration
system.
The bishops' advocacy for legalization and guest worker programs
rests on several judgments about immigration policy. First, they assume that
illegal immigration cannot be controlled; 78 this judgment must in turn rest
upon two controverted propositions: that illegal immigrants are not deterred
by enforcement, and that enforcement is too complicated to be carried out
successfully. They may be correct about this, but certainly people might
disagree with them, which suggests that the bishops have foreclosed policy
options.
Second, the bishops assume that the combination of legalization and
guest worker programs will reduce illegal immigration substantially. 79 This
is at least debatable: guest workers are rarely temporary workers, and legalization in the past did not decrease illegal immigration in the United
States. 80 In fact, some argue this combination has increased illegal immigration, by improving the immigrant support network in the United States,
and by holding out the promise of future legalization for illegal
immigrants. 81
Finally, by raising concerns about recent steps that make asylum
claims more difficult in the United States, the bishops ignore the widespread abuse of the asylum system. Every immigrant is assumed to be an
asylee-in-waiting. 82 But, the bishops give no consideration to the high rates
at which asylee claimants fail to show up for their hearings. 83
These are just a few of the judgments that are implicit in the bishops'
advocacy for immigration refonn. People may disagree with the bishops'
conclusions about the causes of immigration, the effects of legalization, the
prospects for enforcement, and the problems of asylum abuse. Disagreements about appropriate policy may easily turn on these issues. By using
their teaching authority to promote concrete refonns, the bishops take for
granted the prudential judgments necessary to evaluate policy. By framing
the issues in tenns of conversion and xenophobia, the bishops cast aspersions on the faithful who disagree with their policy analysis.

78. Id.1[ 79.
79. Id. I[ 76.
80. See CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION-STATE: THE UNITED STATES,
GERMANY, AND GREAT BRITAiN (1999).
81. See BRIMELOW, supra note 54.
82. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 38, TI 92-99.
83. For a summary of statistics on no-show rates, see Bill Frelick, U.S. Detention of Asylum
Seekers and Human Rights, MIGRATION POLICY INSTIT1JTE, March 1, 2005, http://www.migration
information.orglFeature/display.cfm?id=296. Roughly thirty percent of asylum claimants fail to
show for their first hearing; the no-show rate is much higher (85%) for claimants who are denied
asylum.
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CONCLUSIONS

I have made the argument that Catholic bishops and those who work in
their name should be reluctant to give specific advice about turning CST
into policy. The principles of CST, which bishops teach with authority, simply do not alone determine which policies should be enacted to address the
current challenges of immigration. By telling Catholics that the Gospel demands support for the McCain-Kennedy reforms and opposition to the Sensenbrenner-King bill, the bishops are usurping the place of the laity, who
are called to exercise prudence in applying clearly understood first principles to messy, chaotic, uncertain environments.

If bishops took prudence more seriously, they would be more guarded
in their support for specific legislative action. Their lobbying campaign is a
violation of the principle of subsidiarity-the principle by which responsibility devolves from higher to lower groups in society. Individual Catholics
are moral agents, and should be allowed to exercise and develop that
agency whenever possible. By allowing individual Catholics the freedom to
make the judgments necessary to apply CST to their local circumstances,
and in the context of their lives as citizens in a democracy, the Catholic
Church will more effectively establish justice.
I argue in this article that the bishops would be prudent to be more
guarded in their promotion of a political agenda. I do not mean to argue that
bishops should never make suggestions, or evaluate concrete realities in
light of CST. It would be impossible for them to speak in purely abstract
terms about society, and irresponsible for them to be silent in the face of
laws and social conditions that directly threaten human dignity. First principles have no real existence apart from concrete circumstance; bishops cannot avoid reference to concrete circumstance when teaching about
principles.
When the bishops suggest policies, however, they ought to include a
prudent disclaimer that their authority in prudential matters is not
equivalent to their authority in matters of CST. An excellent example of this
discretion is "Economic Justice for All," the 1986 Pastoral Letter on the
U.S. economy.84 In a transition section from a treatment of general principle to the analysis of particular economic problems, the bishops claim an
obligation to speak about particulars, but assert no claim to a special authority in teaching about policy:
This document is not a technical blueprint for economic reform.
Rather, it is an attempt to foster a serious moral analysis leading
to a more just economy.
84. NAT'L CONF. OF CATHOUC BrSFIoPS, EcoNOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: CATHOUC SOCIAL
TEACFlING AND TFIE U.S. ECONOMY, TFIIRD DRAFT 37 (U.S. Catholic Conf. Off. of Publ'g and
Promotion Services 1986).
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In focusing on some of the central economic issues and choices in
American life in the light of moral principles, we are aware that
the movement from principle to policy is complex and difficult
and that although moral values are essential in determining public
policies, they do not dictate specific solutions. They must interact
with empirical data, with historical, social, and political realities,
and with competing demands on limited resources. The soundness
of our prudential judgments depends not only on the moral force
of our principles, but also on the accuracy of our information and
the validity of our assumptions.
Our judgments and recommendations on specific economic issues, therefore, do not carry the same moral authority as our statements of universal moral principles and formal church teaching;
the former are related to circumstances which can change or
which can be interpreted differently by people of good will. We
expect and welcome debate on our specific policy recommendations. Nevertheless, we want our statements on these matters to be
given serious consideration by Catholics as they determine
whether their own moral judgments are consistent with the Gospel and with CST.85
This statement could not be clearer. The bishops must teach the faith,
and the principles of a just economy, and to do that they often must get
specific, even to the point of suggesting specific actions. Nevertheless, their
practical agenda does not carry the same weight as their teaching on principle. The bishops were clear about this in 1986. I see no such discretion in
the bishops' blueprint for immigration reform.

85. [d.

